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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Robert Arthur Richmond appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated
assault. He asserts that the district court committed fundamental error by reducing the
State's burden of proof in instructing the jury on self defense and that the district court
erred by denying his motion for a new trial because the court erred by failing to give a
unanimity instruction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Richmond was charged with aggravated assault against his fiance, Michelle
Williams, "by punching her in the head and/or face causing severe swelling and bruising
to her eyes and face, and bleeding to her nose and/or by grabbing her by the neck and
applying pressure." (R., p.25.) Ms. Williams testified that Mr. Richmond was her exfiance and that at the time of the incident in this case had been dating Mr. Richmond for
about eight months. (Tr. Vol. I, p.156, Ls.4-24.) She testified that on March 10, 2012,
Mr. Richmond's vehicle had broken down and needed a new starter; they were in
Garden City across from the Ranch Club.
they could not get the vehicle to start.

Mr. Richmond's mother came to help but

Eventually they jump-started the car.

Once

Mr. Richmond's mother left, Ms. Williams and Mr. Richmond "starting arguing about him
blaming me for him staying here." (Tr. Vol. I, p.158, Ls.1-9.) Mr. Richmond wanted to
move away, and, according to Ms. Williams, he blamed her for him staying in Idaho.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.158, Ls.24-25.)
Once the car was jump-started, Mr. Richmond and Ms. Williams drove toward
Mr. Richmond's mother's house in Meridian. (Tr. Vol. I, p.158, Ls.14-15.) According to
1

Ms. Williams, during the drive, Mr. Richmond was yelling at her about keeping him in
Idaho and was calling her names. (Tr. Vol. I, p.159, Ls.7-12.) Ms. Williams testified that
at this point Mr. Richmond hit her on the side of her head, causing her head to hit the
windshield. (Tr. Vol. I, p.160, Ls.12-18.) He continued to punch her in the eyes and the
nose. (Tr. Vol. I, p.160 Ls.20-23.)
At this point, Ms. Williams stated that she went in and out of consciousness.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.161, Ls.1-2.)
Mr. Richmond.

She denied ever trying to hit him back or scratch

(Tr. Vol. I, p.161, Ls.19-23.)

Eventually, according to Ms. Williams,

Mr. Richmond took the seat belt choked her with it.

(Tr. Vol. I, p.162, Ls.19-23.)

Ms. Williams testified that she lost consciousness after Mr. Richmond choked her.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.163, Ls.20-21.)

However, she told the responding paramedic that she

never lost consciousness. (Tr. Vol. I, p.211, Ls.9-11.)
Mr. Richmond eventually stopped the vehicle at the residence, where, according
to Ms. Williams, Mr. Richmond "pulled me out and ripped my shirt and my sweatshirt
andmybracompletelyoffme." (Tr. Vol. I, p.164, Ls.13-16.)
At this point Ms. Williams went to a neighbor's house and asked them to drive
her to a bar because her friends were there. (Tr. Vol. I, p.165, Ls.13-19.) She had a
shot of whiskey and a beer at the bar and then went to two other bars. (Tr. Vol. I, p.166,
Ls.8-23.) She had also been drinking prior to the drive from Garden City to Meridian.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.169, Ls.2-7.) A bartender called the police after Ms. Williams asked her to.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.167, Ls.1-2.)

Ms. Williams did not call the police because she loved

Mr. Richmond and did not want him to get in trouble. (Tr. Vol. I, p.167, Ls.11-18.) She
never went to the hospital or saw a doctor. (Tr. Vol. I, p.191, Ls.18-22.)
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Mr. Richmond testified and denied that he and Ms. Williams had fought about
him staying in Idaho; Mr. Richmond testified that he found employment in San Diego
and that Ms. Williams "was more than prepared to go."

(Tr. Vol. I, p.264, Ls.2-8.)

According to Mr. Richmond, things started to go "downhill" shortly after they crossed the
intersection of Eagle and Chinden. (Tr. Vol. I, p.272, Ls.6-11.) Ms. Williams began to
discuss how upset she was that she was leaving her family, but she was also talking
about her father because she had had a bad dream the night before. (Tr. Vol. I, p.272,
Ls.8-16.)

Her father had molested her as a child.

(Tr. Vol. I, p.159, Ls.10-12.)

Ms. Williams seemed to be working herself up a bit and Mr. Richmond thought that
perhaps she had too much to drink. (Tr. Vol. I, p.274, Ls.2-9.) He also was not sure
that she had taken her PTSD medicine and he knew she was prone to temper tantrums
when she forgets to take the medicine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.274, Ls.10-25.)
Ms. Williams began getting upset with Mr. Richmond because she did not think
he was paying attention or taking her seriously. (Tr. Vol. I, p.275, Ls.9-19.) She then hit
Mr. Richmond in the arm, but not very hard. (Tr. Vol. I, p.278, Ls.2-15.) Mr. Richmond
testified that at this point they stopped at a friends' house because Ms. Williams wanted
marijuana.

(Tr. Vol. I, p.278, Ls.14-25.)

However, the friend was not at home and

Mr. Richmond and Ms. Williams continued toward Meridian. (Tr. Vol. I, p.279, Ls.2-5.)
After Mr. Richmond merged into traffic, Ms. Williams punched him on the side of his
head and insisted that they go back to the friend's house and try again.

(Tr. Vol. I,

p.280, L.20 - p.281, L.5.) Mr. Richmond refused and Ms. Williams then punched him
again, causing his head to snap back and his glasses to fall off.

(Tr. Vol. I, p.281,

Ls.14-24.) He realized at this point that the vehicle was moving into oncoming traffic
and he was stunned. (Tr. Vol. I, p.282, Ls.6-25.)
3

At this point, Mr. Richmond pulled the vehicle over and told Ms. Williams to exit.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p.283, Ls.3-17.) She refused to exit but promised to calm down. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.284, Ls.2-15.) Shortly thereafter, however, she "reached out and she grabbed me by
my shirt sleeve and pulled me forward and she started pummeling me.

She started

hitting me on the side of the head and face, and I was putting my hand up to block her
from hitting me."

(Tr. Vol. I, p.286, Ls.14-21.)

Mr. Richmond realized he was then

driving in a construction area and then into oncoming traffic, so, "there was nothing else
that I could do at that particular point, so I started to fight back." (Tr. Vol. I., p.287, Ls.115.)
Mr. Richmond testified that he "reverse punched her, and "we were kind of
swinging wildly back and forth." (Tr. Vol. I, p.287, Ls.17-25.) Mr. Richmond stated that
the struggle only lasted a few seconds and that, after landing a couple of punches, he
felt Ms. Williams stop punching him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.288, Ls.22-25.)
At this point, he used, "an up-and-under move", where, "I went over her shoulder
and went under her elbow and grabbed her by her sweatshirt and pushed her sweatshirt
back over as I was leaning on the car this way pushing her back into the seat." (Tr. Vol.
I, p.289, Ls.5-11.) Ms. Williams continued to push forward toward him and he continued
to push back; they continued pushing each other until Mr. Richmond pulled into the
driveway, where he told Ms. Williams he was going to let her go. (Tr. Vol. I, p.291, Ls.119.) He let her go and jumped out of the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. I, p.291, Ls.16-25.)
Afterward, Mr. Richmond and Ms. Williams spoke for about 10-15 minutes; he
noticed that her nose was bleeding and her eye was swelling. (Tr. Vol. I, p.292, Ls.825.) At this point it dawned on Mr. Richmond that Ms. Williams had forgotten to take her

4

medication and thought that this might explain her behavior. (Tr. Vol. I, p.292, L.17
p.293, L.4.)
Mr. Richmond felt awful about what happened. (Tr. Vol. I, p.293, Ls.4-7.) He
testified that he did not feel in imminent danger of bodily harm the first time that
Ms. Williams began hitting him but did the second time - "I thought that we could
probably get into a really bad accident at that point when I saw the car corning toward
us."

(Tr. Vol. I, p.293, Ls.15-19.)

He believed that his actions were necessary to

prevent the two of them from crashing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.294, Ls.1-7.)
Mr. Richmond's defense at trial was therefore self-defense. While the district
court properly instructed the jury that, "the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt" that Mr. Richmond's actions were not justifiable, it incorrectly
informed the jury that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he was in "imminent
danger of death or great bodily injury." (R., pp. 95-96; Tr. Vol. II, p.38, L.7 - p.39, L.8.)
The jury should have been instructed that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he
was in danger only of bodily injury.
Mr. Richmond was found guilty of aggravated assault. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.90, Ls.2125.) He subsequently pleaded guilty to a persistent violator enhancement. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.96, Ls.13-23.) He then filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that the district court
erred by failing to provide a unanimity instruction, because, "what we have was those
two separate acts alleged by the state. And it was not - the jury did not decide which
act was done in order to support the conviction of aggravated assault." ((R., p.112;
Tr. Vol. I, p.316, Ls.7-12.) The district court denied the motion for a new trial and then
imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.127; 137.)
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Pursuant to a petition for post-conviction relief, the district court vacated the initial
judgment and reentered the judgment for the purpose of allowing Mr. Richmond to
appeal. (R., p.150.) Mr. Richmond then appealed. (R., p.152.) He asserts that the
district court committed fundamental error by reducing the State's burden of proof in
instructing the jury on self defense and that the district court erred by denying his motion
for a new trial because the court erred by failing to give a unanimity instruction.
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court commit fundamental error my misdirecting the jury on selfdefense?

2.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Richmond's motion for a new trial
because the court should have given a unanimity instruction?

7

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Misdirecting The Jury On SelfDefense

A.

Introduction
Mr. Richmond asserts that the district court committed fundamental error by

incorrectly informing the jury that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he was in
"imminent danger of death or great bodily injury." Because he was only required to
demonstrate a fear of bodily injury, the district court erred, and this error affected the
outcome of the proceedings.

B.

The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Misdirecting The Jury On
Self-Defense
Mr. Richmond's defense at trial was self-defense.

While the district court

properly instructed the jury that, "the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt" that Mr. Richmond's actions were not justifiable, it incorrectly
informed the jury that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he was in "imminent
danger of death or great bodily injury." (R., pp. 95-96; Tr. Vol. II, p.38, L.7 - p.39, L.8.)
The jury should have been instructed that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he
was in danger only of bodily injury.
Mr. Richmond acknowledges that he did not object to the self defense
instructions at trial. "Idaho decisional law, however, has long allowed appellate courts
to consider a claim of error to which no objection was made below if the issue presented

State v. Velasco, 154 Idaho 534, 536-37

rises to the level of fundamental error."

(Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007)). Pursuant to State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010), if an alleged error was not followed by a
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contemporaneous objection, the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged error ( 1)
violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists
(without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3)
was not harmless. If the defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained-of
error satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court must vacate and
remand. Id.
The first prong of Perry is satisfied because the requirement that the State prove
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded in the constitutional
guarantee of due process.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979); State v.

Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47 (Ct. App. 2000).
This standard of proof "plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure"
because it "provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-that
bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation
of the administration of our criminal law.' " In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)
(quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an element
of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process, State v.
Draper, 151 Idaho 576,588 (2011); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007); see
also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); or as a violation of the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999);
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78. See also State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App.
2012).
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In Idaho, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self-defense. As the United States Supreme Court has noted,
"[w]e are aware that all but two of the States, Ohio and South Carolina, have
abandoned the common-law rule and require the prosecution to prove the absence of
self-defense when it is properly raised by the defendant." Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,
236 (1987). The Criminal Jury Instruction also clearly places the burden on the State.

See ICJI 1517. While the Martin Court ruled that the states were not constitutionally
required to make the State meet this burden, it is clear that Idaho has chosen to place
the burden on the State.

This burden cannot be lowered without violating

Mr. Richmond's due process and Sixth Amendment rights. Because disproving the fear
of any bodily injury is more difficult than disproving fear of imminent death or great
bodily injury, the instruction misstated the State's burden of proof. Thus, because the
error implicates Mr. Richmond's right to due process, the first prong of Perry is satisfied.
The error also plainly exists. Mr. Richmond submits that while the district court
properly instructed the jury that, "the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt" that Mr. Richmond's actions were not justifiable, it incorrectly
informed the jury that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he was in "imminent
danger of death or great bodily injury." (R., pp. 95-96; Tr. Vol. 11, p.38, L.7 - p.39, L.8.)
The jury should have been instructed that Mr. Richmond must have believed that he
was in danger only of bodily injury. The jury instructions in the record plainly require
Mr. Richmond to demonstrate that he was in "imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury." (R., pp.95-96.) This is also plainly wrong. The Court of Appeals has explained:
The right to defend oneself from attack is embodied in several Idaho
statutes. Idaho Code § 19-201 provides that "lawful resistance to the
commission of a public offense may be made: (1) By the party about to be
injured"; and § 19-202 specifies that "[r]esistance sufficient to prevent the
10

offense may be made by the party about to be injured: (1) to prevent an
offense against his person .... " Section 19-202A further provides that "[n]o
person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind
whatsoever for protecting himself ... by reasonable means necessary .... "5
These statutes do not require that the defendant believe himself to be in
danger of great bodily injury in order to assert self-defense as justification
for a battery.
The Idaho Supreme Court considered whether fear of great bodily injury is
necessary in State v. Woodward, 58 Idaho 385 (1937). At issue there was
the propriety of a self-defense instruction given in a trial for assault with a
deadly weapon. The trial court had instructed the jury that selfdefense would justify the assault only if the defendant's act was
"necessary to prevent the infliction upon him of great bodily injury."
The Supreme Court held that, although the instruction would be
correct if the defendant were being tried for a homicide, it was
erroneous in a prosecution for aggravated assault. The Court stated,
"A person who is assaulted or interfered with by another without
provocation may use sufficient force to repel the attack without being guilty
of assault even though he may not believe himself to be in danger of
grievous bodily harm." Id. at 392 (quoting People v. Lopez, 238 App. Div.
619,265 N.Y.S. 211,213 (1933)).

State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328-29 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added). The law is
thus clear that in a prosecution for aggravated assault, like Mr. Richmond's case, a
defendant need only be in danger of any bodily injury. The second prong of Perry is
therefore satisfied.
Regarding the third prong of the Perry test, there is a reasonable probability that
the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Mr. Richmond's sole defense in
this case was self-defense.

He testified that Ms. Williams became irate and began

punching him and he responded by punching her back in order to make her stop. He
also testified that she pushed herself into him, causing him to lose control of the vehicle
for a time and causing him to move into oncoming traffic.

It was in response to this

pushing that Mr. Richmond used the "up and over" move, which Ms. Williams described
as using the seatbelt to strangle her.
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The jury instruction required a finding that Mr. Richmond fear an imminent
danger of death or great bodily injury.
bodily injury was sufficient.

(R., pp.95-96.) However, a finding of simple

In this case, the jury could have easily concluded that

Ms. Williams' conduct did not create a fear of imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury, but could have concluded that the simple act of either punching or pushing
Mr. Richmond placed him in fear of any bodily injury.
"[W'here the jury instructions were ... partially erroneous . . . the appellate
court may apply the harmless error test, and where the evidence supporting a finding on
the omitted element is overwhelming and uncontroverted, so that no rational jury could
have found that the state failed to prove that element, the constitutional violation may be
deemed harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224. Mr. Richmond's fear of harm was hardly
uncontested - it was his defense. The jury could have concluded that Mr. Richmond
feared bodily injury but not imminent danger of death or great bodily injury and still
convicted him of aggravated assault. This was error. And because this error goes to
the heart of Mr. Richmond's defense and the jury could have concluded that
Ms. Williams' behavior placed Mr. Richmond in fear of bodily injury, there is a
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.

11.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Richmond's Motion For A New Trial Because
The District Court Should Have Given A Unanimity Instruction

A.

Introduction
Jurors in Idaho must unanimously agree on a guilty verdict. Under the facts and

circumstances of this case, the district court was required to instruct the jurors that they
must unanimously agree on which of the alleged assaults constituted the charged
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offense. The district court erred by denying Mr. Richmond's motion for a new trial on
this basis.

B.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Richmond's Motion For A New Trial
Because The District Court Should Have Given A Unanimity Instruction
Mr. Richmond raised this issue in his motion for a new trial.

(R., p.112.)

He

brought his motion pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(5), which provides:
When a verdict has been rendered against the defendant the court may,
upon his application, grant a new trial in the following cases only:

[... ]
5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter or law, or has erred
in the decision of any question of law arising during the court of the trial.

1.C. § 19-2406(5).
Jurors must be instructed on all of the matters of law necessary for their
consideration,

including "instructions on rules of law that are 'material to the

determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence."' State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
710 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132 and quoting State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483
(Ct. App. 1999)).

Idaho law requires a trial court to instruct the jury that they must

unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt in order for the defendant to be convicted.

Id. at 711 (citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267-268 (Ct. App. 2000).) However, "An
instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense
... is generally not required." Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho
13, 19 (1999); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991).) Nevertheless, due process
bars states from convicting a person for a violation of a generic category of "crime"
based upon any combination of facts the state sees fit to allege. Schad, at 633. As
Justice Scalia has observed, "We would not permit, for example, an indictment charging
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that the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday."

Id. at 651

(Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.)
In Severson, the defendant was alleged to have murdered his wife by alternative
means - either by suffocating her or by poisoning her.

Severson, at 701.

The

defendant argued that the district court was required to instruct the jury that they must
be unanimous in determining the means by which he allegedly committed the murder.
Id. at 710. In rejecting Severson's argument, the Idaho Supreme Court found "the trial

court in this case was not required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on
the means by which Severson killed his wife" because he "was charged with the single
act of murdering his wife." Id. at 712. Furthermore, the Court reasoned,
Although the evidence showed that Severson could have murdered his
wife by either overdosing her or suffocating her, it did not indicate that
separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reus
occurred. The very nature of the crime of murder eliminates this
possibility. Absent evidence of more than one instance in which Severson
engaged in the charged conduct, the jury was not required to unanimously
agree on the facts giving rise to the offense.
Id. The Court recognized that the defendant could not be convicted of the single charge

of murdering his wife on more than one occasion; thus, the district court did not err by
failing to give a unanimity instruction. Id.
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized that a unanimity instructions is
necessary where separate crimes, requiring proof of distinct unions of mens rea and
actus reus, are alleged, even where the separate crimes are alleged in one count. The

ultimate question is whether each alleged incident was part of a single course of
conduct. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414 (1986). As the Major Court noted, the
distinct between whether a course of conduct constitutes one or multiple offense is
important as,
14

to charge a defendant with two offenses when only one was committed
violates the defendant's right against double jeopardy, U.S. Const. amend.
V, Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; conversely, to charge a defendant with
one offense when more than one was committed can prejudice the
defendant "in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a
conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each separate
offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the
defendant to double jeopardy." Criminal Procedure,§ 19.2(e), p.457.
Id. (emphasis added).
In Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of appeals held
that the "act or acts" language contained in Idaho Code§ 18-1508 ("Lewd conduct with
a minor child under sixteen"), does not "allow for a continuing course of conduct
element.

Rather, the legislature's use of the plural is a recognition that a series of

sexual contacts by different means which occur as a part of a single incident, i.e., a

continuous transaction without significant breaks, are to be charged as a single
count of lewd conduct."

Id. at 266 (emphasis added).

Based upon the evidence

presented at trial, the Miller Court found that the defendant was alleged to have
committed six separate acts of manual to genital contact and that trial counsel was
deficient in failing to request a unanimity instruction (although the court found there was
no prejudice). Id. at 267-269.
Furthermore, in State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 33-34 (1997), the Idaho Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument that his double jeopardy rights were violated
based upon his being charged with and convicted of both lewd conduct and infamous
crime against nature, as each act of fellatio performed on the victim were separate and
distinct. The Court found,
The first sexual assault took place on J.S.'s bed. The second assault took
place on J.S.'s couch. The amended information clearly required proof of
these different facts. Further, other events occurred in between these acts
of sexual assault. After the first assault, J.S. was pulled off the bed and
thrown onto the couch where Bush told J.S. he wanted J.S. to engage in
15

fellatio. J.S. refused and was pushed to his knees and Bush tied a t-shirt
around J.S.'s face. Bush again placed J.S. on the couch and tied his arms
behind his back with a cord. It was after these events that the second act
of sexual assault occurred. Bush then again placed J.S.'s penis in his
mouth for five to ten minutes. These facts appear to demonstrate that
there were two separate and distinct sexual assaults committed on J.S.

Id. at 34.

Similarly, in State v. Grinolds, 121 Idaho 673 ( 1992), the Court found no

double jeopardy violation where the defendant was convicted of two counts of rape, as
the evidence showed that despite the fact that each act occurred in the same bedroom,
the defendant left the bedroom between each act and jury was properly instructed they
had to consider each alleged act separately. Id. at 675
Thus, while Idaho law does not generally require jury unanimity of the underlying
facts supporting an element of the crime, where one crime is alleged to have been
committed by alternative means and where the defendant is alleged to have committed
separate and distinct criminal acts, Idaho law requires unanimity even if the acts are
alleged in a single count.
In denying Mr. Richmond's motion for a new trial, the district court held,
[t]he present case is an alternative means case. The evidence at trial was
of a single, ongoing incident. Whether one accepts the Defendant's
narrative or the victim's narrative, the crime here took place with the
Defendant [at] first hitting, then choking the victim. Either the hitting or the
choking could have been the basis for the jury's verdict. But there merely
constitute the means of the commission of the crime. There was one
continuous course of conduct.
(R., p.131.) Mr. Richmond respectfully asserts that the district court erred. While there
is no doubt that the all of the events occurred in the vehicle on the way from Garden
City to Meridian, Mr. Richmond specifically testified to distinct acts.

He testified that

first, Ms. Williams punched him and he punched her in return. He testified that after
landing a couple of punches, Ms. Williams stopped. This is one distinct event involving
a particular type of force by both Ms. Williams and Mr. Richmond.
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However, after

stopping this behavior, Ms. Williams then began to push herself onto Mr. Richmond, and
he responded by using the "up and under" move. This is a separate event involving a
different type of force by both Ms. Williams and Mr. Richmond. And this is critical in a
case like this that involves self-defense, because, based on the fact that Ms. Williams
used two different types of force, the jury was required to determine which if any acts by
Mr. Richmond were reasonable in response to that force.
Thus, unlike the charge in Severson (or in State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970
(2008) (unanimity not required as to whether the defendant committed the murder
herself or aided and abetted another) and State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 (2010)
(unanimity not required in determining which of the parties to an alleged conspiracy
committed which act in furtherance of the conspiracy)), Mr. Richmond was essentially
alleged to have committed multiple assaults - punching and strangling. He defended
each of these alleged assaults by asserting that he was acting in self-defense. Thus,
while some jurors may have found that Mr. Richmond committed an assault by
punching, other may have found that the assault was committed by grabbing
Ms. Williams' neck (or the use of the "up and over" move) and others may have found
that one of Mr. Richmond's actions was justifiable in response to one of Ms. Williams'
actions.
Mr. Richmond acknowledges the Court of Appeals' recent opinion in State v.
Moffatt, 154 Idaho 529 (Ct. App. 2013), in which the court stated,
an attempt to separate Moffat's grabbing of his girlfriend's hair and
throwing her around the room and into objects and pushing her to the
ground from grabbing her throat during the same dispute is an
impermissible attempt ... to divide a single crime into a series of temporal
or spatial units to avoid double jeopardy limitations.
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Id. at 534, 300 P.3d at 66. Mr. Richmond asserts that his case is different because if

the jury believed his account of the incident, Ms. Williams stopped punching him after
he landed a couple of punches. At this point, Mr. Richmond stopped punching in selfdefense.

Then, however, Ms. Williams applied a different type of force, and

Mr. Richmond responded with a different type of self-defense. Thus, while this all may
have occurred during one car ride, there is separate and distinct conduct by
Ms. Williams, which, if the jury believed Mr. Richmond, led to separate and distinct acts
of self-defense by Mr. Richmond. Therefore, the district court erred in failing to instruct
the jury that they must be unanimous in their determination of which assault
Mr. Richmond was guilty and erred by denying his motion for a new trial on this basis.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Richmond requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014.

.C TIS
tate Appellate Public Defender
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